DeNexus Blog - Industrial Cyber Risk Quantification

What Are the Top 6 Most Effective Cybersecurity Solutions for Industrial Environments?

Written by DeNexus | Jan 14, 2026 12:00:09 AM

Industrial environments face an unprecedented cybersecurity crisis. As operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT) systems converge, critical infrastructure operators are grappling with an expanding attack surface, sophisticated nation-state threats, and an overwhelming volume of vulnerabilities that demand immediate attention. The question isn't whether your industrial systems will be targeted—it's when, and whether you'll be prepared to respond to reduce the severity of impact. 

 

The Industrial Cybersecurity Crisis: By the Numbers

The statistics paint a sobering picture of the current threat landscape:

  • Over one in five organizations (22%) reported a cybersecurity incident in the past year, with 40% causing operational disruption and nearly 20% resulting in significant impact, according to the SANS Institute 2025 State of ICS Security Report (SANS Institute)
  • Half of OT organizations fell victim to breaches in 2025, even as they advanced their security programs, as disclosed in the Fortinet 2025 Operational Technology Security Report (Industrial Cyber)
  • OT attacks now represent 18.2% of all cyber threats, with manufacturing facing a 59.3% cybercrime rate and new ICS malware emerging, according to ENISA's Threat Landscape 2025 report (ENISA)
  • Vulnerability counts associated with ICS advisories reached 2,065 CVEs in 2025—the highest total on record, representing sharp year-over-year growth (SOCRadar)
  • 75% of OT attacks begin as IT breaches, highlighting the critical importance of addressing IT/OT convergence risks (Zero Networks)

These numbers underscore a fundamental reality: industrial cybersecurity is no longer an optional investment—it's an operational imperative.

 

The Unique Challenges of Industrial Cybersecurity

Industrial control systems (ICS) and OT environments face distinct challenges that set them apart from traditional IT security:

 

  1. Legacy Systems and Air-Gap Mythology

Many industrial control systems were designed decades ago without security or connectivity in mind. The myth of the "air-gapped" OT network has long been shattered. As Claroty's 2026 Cybersecurity Guide notes, systems that were previously isolated are now connected to IT networks and the internet, creating an expanded attack surface with each newly connected device (Claroty).

These legacy systems often lack fundamental cybersecurity capabilities such as encryption, authentication, and secure protocols—leaving them vulnerable to modern, advanced cyberattacks.

 

  1. The Overwhelming CVE Challenge

With over 2,065 CVEs identified for ICS systems in 2025 alone, security teams face an impossible task: how do you prioritize which vulnerabilities to address first when downtime is not an option and maintenance windows are rare?

Traditional vulnerability scoring methods like CVSS severity provide limited value in OT environments where operational context, asset criticality, and potential safety impacts must all factor into prioritization decisions. Security teams are drowning in alerts, unable to distinguish between theoretical risks and actual threats that could halt production or endanger lives.

 

  1. IT/OT Convergence: Double-Edged Sword

The convergence of IT and OT systems offers tremendous operational benefits—real-time data analysis, predictive maintenance, and improved efficiency. However, this interconnectivity also means that cyberattacks originating in enterprise IT networks can quickly spread to critical industrial systems.

As industrial cybersecurity experts note, "IT and OT systems have historically been managed separately, with different teams responsible for each area. As organizations become more reliant on interconnected systems, there has been growth toward convergence of these two areas" (Claroty).

 

  1. Nation-State Threats and Advanced Persistent Threats

State-sponsored actors are increasingly targeting critical infrastructure with patience and operational sophistication. Rather than seeking immediate disruption, these adversaries focus on establishing persistent access, mapping environments, and maintaining options for future leverage.

According to the Google Cybersecurity Forecast 2026, state-sponsored campaigns are aggressively targeting exposed OT assets and supply chains, forcing defenders to elevate their security posture beyond conventional perimeter controls (Industrial Cyber).

 

Essential Cybersecurity Solutions for Industrial Environments

Given these challenges, what are the most effective solutions for protecting industrial operations? The answer lies in a comprehensive, integrated approach that addresses visibility, risk prioritization, and operational resilience.

DeNexus was commissioned to perform research to identify the most effective security controls for ICS/OT security environments, as part of a larger risk management initiative. Our work included interviews of over 8 reputable OT cyber experts, each with over 15 years of experience each, as well as review of more recent OT guidance, papers, and research.

Fourteen (14) control areas were identified, but the top 6 are:

1.1 Defensible Architecture

Establish a secure-by-design OT network architecture with robust segmentation and controlled trust boundaries so threats cannot move laterally from IT to OT. Implement an electronic perimeter with enforced ingress/egress rules and (where needed) OT DMZs / unidirectional controls.

Why?

  • Cannot prevent threats moving laterally into OT without segmentation
  • Don’t let IT attacks propagate into OT
  • A perimeter must be established as the foundation for protection, detection, and containment.
  • Electronic access points installed to control flow both in and out of the perimeter.
  • Must protect control & safety

Requirements:

  • Get ICS/OT devices off Internet
  • Get ICS/OT devices off corporate network
  • Move ICS/OT devices to their own network segment
  • Establish electronic perimeter that is controlled with electronic access points (FW, Diode)
  • Identify, audit, understand, and scrutinize each logical network data flow. Special focus on flows supporting control, safety, and their configuration
  • Ingress/inbound firewall rules
  • Egress/outbound firewall rules

  • Establish DMZ (for medium or higher security requirements)

 

1.2 Secure the Perimeter & External Access

Identify and eliminate or harden all OT external access paths (internet exposure, remote access, conduits) through inventory/inspection and strong IAM/MFA. Use secure intermediaries (e.g., VPN/DMZ) and avoid direct remote admin protocols into OT without appropriate controls.

Why?

  • Leading attack vectors are:
    • Internet-accessible devices
    • Vulnerable cyber assets > Exploitation of remote services
    • Credential theft > External remote services
    • Content injection
    • Secure remote access
  • This control directly targets access vectors above

Requirements:

  • Visual inspection of all cyber assets, networks, and cables. Document, inventory, collect.
  • Identify all access points, remote access, and conduits into perimeter of ICS/OT system
  • Identify applications and systems that require external network connectivity
  • Harden any external applications and remote access. Require multifactor authentication (MFA). Implement enhanced security measures.
  • Identity & access management (IAM). Unique identities, strong passwords, least privilege, etc.
  • Virtual private networking (VPN) or clientless VPN or other intermediary between external and ICS/OT systems. Leverage DMZ. Avoid remote access tools (e.g., RDP, SSH, VNC) without intermediary system.
  • Authorize remote access per-session, explicit approval, as-needed (if possible)
  • Strictest and most ambitious vulnerability detection, mitigation, and patching at perimeter.

 

1.3 Secured Data & Configuration Backups

Maintain secured, offsite, immutable, and tested backups (including “known-good” baselines and critical configs/security data) to withstand ransomware and support restoration/IR. Ensure annual restoration testing and a defined baseline update process.

Why?

  • Ransomware operators destroy backups to increase chance of payout
  • Known good baseline is also good for:
    • Change detection
    • Troubleshooting
    • Incident response
    • System restoration
    • Validating integrity

Requirements

  • Identify critical functions, applications, data, and cyber assets
  • Backup critical data, configuration
  • Document configuration, update drawings, as-builts
  • Backup sensitive data (e.g., Active Directory, certificates, license keys, passwords)
  • Store backups offsite
  • Immutable backups (cannot delete) for ransomware preparation
  • Restoration testing at least annually for each type of cyber asset
  • Establish ‘last known good’ baseline. Baseline update process.

 

1.4 Initiate Logging & IR/DR Plans

Turn on logging/monitoring for capable OT assets and infrastructure and create OT-specific incident response (IR) and disaster recovery (DR) plans. Centralize and protect logs, monitor routinely, and plan specifically for OT scenarios rather than relying on IT-only playbooks.

Why?

  • It is near impossible to detect abnormal or malicious activity without logging
  • This the first step to reduce ‘infection-to-detection’ dwell time.
  • Don’t rely on IT IR/DR to save the organization, must have OT-specific scenarios, resources, and strategy in place
  • Incident responders will be severely handicapped if they don’t have access to historical data
  • Detectors in the right locations, multiple ingress/egress locations, N-S, plus E-W
  • Mandiant Theory of 99
  • Dragos IR for OT
  • OT incident responder first-hand experience.

Requirements

  • Enable logging/auditing on all devices supporting this capability
  • Enable storage, retention, and forwarding of logs
  • Centralize, aggregate, and protect logs from tampering
  • Monitor logs on a regular basis. Identify unauthorized flows related to control, safety, or their configuration
  • Develop OT-specific incident response plan
  • Develop OT-specific disaster recovery plan

 

1.5 Harden Shared Infrastructure

Harden and patch shared/intermediary OT services (e.g., AD/IAM/PKI/DNS/NTP/DMZ tooling, virtualization, remote access services) because these systems are frequent compromise points and can be used to reach OT. Apply tiered policy, continuous vulnerability management, and stronger controls (including whitelisting where warranted).

Why?

  • Shared cyber assets are greater criticality than the ICS/OT systems they support
  • Can be used to compromise ICS/OT systems
  • , shared identity mgmt, virtual infra, AD, …
  • OEM vendor constraints shouldn’t be minimal here
  • Funnel of Opportunity: 99% of OT attacks detected in intermediary systems

Requirements

  • Identify cyber assets supporting shared infrastructure services
  • Develop a high-security policy with minimum requirements for shared and unconstrained cyber assets (e.g., continuous vulnerability scanning, patching, priority remediation)
  • Apply hardening to shared cyber assets (e.g., Disable unused ports, services, features; Configure local firewall; Disable weak protocols and passwords)
  • For higher security environments, deploy application whitelisting (AWL) on intermediary DMZ assets
  • Apply hardening to protect the following services: NTP, DNS, Active Directory, IAM, auth, PKI, network infra mgmt, RDS, SRA, VM, SNMP, SMTP, Cloud, etc.
  • Separate IT-OT service sharing where possible (dependency reduction)

 

1.6 IT–OT Dependency & Failure Resilience

Identify critical IT/OT dependencies and ensure OT can operate safely in isolation or degraded modes if IT is attacked. Perform BIA and system-of-systems dependency analysis, and validate OT isolation/manual operations through testing.

Why?

  • Don’t let IT attacks shutdown ICS/OT production
  • Don’t let IT attacks propagate into OT
  • Proactively prepare for OT isolation or degraded operations in the event of IT network attack

Requirements

  • Identify IT-OT critical cyber assets and applications
  • Perform business impact assessment (BIA)
  • Identify critical OT processes and systems that require external network connectivity
  • Perform system-of-systems analysis to identify dependencies between cyber assets, networks, applications, infrastructure, IT, and OT. Most important, identify where OT cannot be isolated and relies on IT services to continue operations. Identify dependencies on cyber assets, networks, applications and data between IT and OT
  • Implement technical changes, processes, procedures, and other workarounds to ensure OT can continue to operate unaffected or degraded if the IT network is under attack.
  • Validate OT network isolation, in the event of an indirect IT attack. This ensures the plan works as expected!
  • Validate manual operations & control of OT, in the event of a direct OT attack.

 

Continue to monitor the DeNexus blog in the future for the full 14 control areas, justification, and requirements.

 

The Path Forward: Integrated Security Strategies for 2026 and Beyond

As we move deeper into 2026, the industrial cybersecurity landscape demands integrated approaches that converge governance, visibility, and operational risk management. Organizations that will succeed are those that:

  1. Unify IT and OT security governance with clear ownership across teams
  2. Implement risk-based prioritization focused on business impact and financial exposure
  3. Adopt zero trust principles pragmatically, without compromising operational continuity
  4. Treat cybersecurity as a business enabler, not just a compliance requirement
  5. Quantify cyber risk in financial terms to secure appropriate resources and executive support

 

Conclusion: From Reactive Defense to Proactive Resilience

The most effective cybersecurity solutions for industrial environments are those that move beyond reactive, compliance-driven approaches to proactive, risk-based strategies grounded in operational reality and financial clarity.

As Robert Huber, chief security officer at Tenable Public Sector, emphasizes: "Risk quantification must shift from counting vulnerabilities to describing impacts in operational terms, such as uptime, safety, production quality, and regulatory exposure" (Industrial Cyber).

Organizations can no longer afford to treat thousands of CVEs equally or make cybersecurity decisions based on abstract technical scores. By embracing quantified approaches to vulnerability management and cyber risk—approaches that translate technical vulnerabilities into financial exposure and business impact—industrial operators can finally break free from the cycle of alert fatigue and reactive firefighting.

The future of industrial cybersecurity lies not in chasing every vulnerability, but in understanding which vulnerabilities truly matter to your business, quantifying the financial risk they represent, and making informed strategic decisions that protect operations, ensure safety, and enable business growth.

 

About DeNexus:

DeNexus provides advanced cybersecurity solutions for industrial environments, including Cyber Risk Quantification & Management and Quantified Vulnerability Management platforms that translate cyber risks into financial metrics, enabling organizations to make informed business decisions about cybersecurity investments and priorities.

Ready to go deeper? Explore DeNexus DeRISK, and see how DeRISK™ CRQ & DeRISK QVM can support data‑driven decisions across your industrial control systems.

  

Sources Referenced:

 

 
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